



**National  
Foreign  
Assessment  
Center**

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# **East Asia Review**

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**20 October 1981**

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EAST ASIA REVIEW

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This publication is produced by the Office of East Asian Analysis. Some issues contain articles drafted in other offices. Some articles are preliminary or speculative in nature, but the contents normally are coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article represents the views of a single analyst; these items are clearly designated as uncoordinated views.

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NORTH KOREAN SUCCESSION: THE MESSAGE IS THE MEDIA

Pyongyang's succession campaign has advanced to a new stage. North Korean newspapers have begun according Kim Chong-il media treatment exceeding that given to any other North Korean leader with the exception of Kim Il-song. The new media image appears to reflect an increase in Kim Chong-il's power and authority as well as confidence on the part of the regime that opposition to the succession is being successfully managed.

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After years of being referred to in the official North Korean media by codewords such as "Party Center," Kim Chong-il was publicly identified as a ranking member of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) Politburo at the Sixth Party Congress last October. His surfacing did not, however, lead to any public media role for him. Newspapers and radio continued to refer to the younger Kim indirectly, by codewords, and in a generalized sense. Thus, his name was mysteriously missing from the media for seven months, reappearing in late May.

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New Phase Begins

Since August, however, Kim Chong-il has been assuming a heightened visibility in the tightly controlled press. Major articles have reported on his guidance activities on four occasions. In the party daily:

- Articles have appeared on page 1 in the right-lead article position, with Kim Chong-il's name and party position prominently displayed in the headline.
- The size of the headline and type font has increased with each succeeding article.
- His name is always printed in boldface type, as is that of Kim Il-song.

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조선로동당 중앙위원회 정치국 상무위원회  
위원이며 당중앙위원회 비서인 김정일동지가  
표향 산지구를 실무시찰하였다

조선로동당 중앙위원회 정치국 상무위원회  
위원이며 당 중앙위원회 비서인  
김정일 동지가 완공 단계에  
들어선 빙상관과 천석식당  
건설사업을 실무지도하였다

조선로동당 중앙위원회 정치국 상무  
위원이며 당 중앙위원회 비  
**김정일동지가 완공단계에 들어  
대학습당건설사업을 실무지도**

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-- His activities are reported by the Nodong Sinmun "political news team," which previously had reported exclusively on Kim Il-song's activities. [ ]

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With the exception of Kim Il-song, no other North Korean personality has received comparable treatment since at least the inception of the Kim Il-song personality cult in the 1960s. This leaves no doubt that Kim Chong-il has been placed in a position second only to Kim Il-song himself. [ ]

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Kim Chong-il is not as yet receiving media treatment equal to that of Kim Il-song:

- His photo does not appear accompanying the articles.
- He is not consistently referred to in honorific language or by his title "dear leader" in news articles.
- The type font used in headlines is still somewhat smaller than that used for Kim Il-song. [ ]

The press has also recently begun giving prominent play to foreign letters referring to Kim Chong-il in glowing honorifics and by his title--but always, of course, giving equal attention to Kim Il-song. North Korean newspapers make a sharp distinction between their domestic and foreign commentary, thereby allowing the latter to say things that are too sensitive to be attributed to the party-controlled press. [ ]

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#### The Codewords Continue

Despite the increasing references to Kim Chong-il in the press, the media continue to use codewords to refer to him. Kulloja, the KWP theoretical journal, has recently carried articles heavily publicizing the "Party Center," some indirectly alluding to the succession. Newspapers continue to describe the achievements of Kim Chong-il by using the terms "Party Center" and "Ray of Guidance." Special columns in the youth league organ--as before--describe his guidance activities and explain his teachings. Now, however, there are in addition mysterious, underlined quotations, unattributed,

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but by context unmistakably those of Kim Chong-il. In general, only Kim Il-song is directly quoted in media commentaries. [redacted]

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VRPR: Clandestine Capers

While domestic broadcasts are still somewhat chary about mentioning Kim Chong-il's name, the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (VRPR) has gone to the other extreme. The North Korea - based station--which claims to be transmitting from South Korea and often comments on topics considered too sensitive for the domestic media--began to air news and commentary concerning Kim Chong-il on the heels of the party congress last October and has maintained a steady flow ever since. [redacted]

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Programs purport to convey the love and support of the South Korean people for Kim Chong-il (and Kim Il-song). Commentaries unabashedly refer to Kim Chong-il as the "sole successor to the great leader" and the "great sun of Communism." Few South Koreans listen to the VRPR, but the programs, which can be heard in some parts of North Korea, are sometimes rebroadcast by direct wire into local communities and also are occasionally quoted in the press. [redacted]

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Indicative of the new stage of the buildup is the post-sign-on announcement that began in early June. It says that the VRPR "implants in the hearts of the South Korean people the greatness of the beloved leader Comrade Leader Kim Chong-il, sole successor to the great leader and the sun of guidance." The old announcement mentioned only Kim Il-song. [redacted]

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Foreign Praise

As part of the buildup, the regime has also been making special efforts to promote the younger Kim abroad. Until the party congress, no officially sanctioned news of Kim Chong-il was ever made available overseas. Since the congress--and particularly during the last few months--however, pictures of Kim Chong-il have appeared at photo exhibitions overseas, and foreign friendship societies and chuche study groups are encouraged to praise him. Often these accolades appear to be verbatim

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quotes from North Korean propaganda tracts. Pyongyang then replays these bits of foreign praise in the VRPR and in the domestic media--the identical technique used for Kim Il-song's personality cult. [ ]

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Another aspect of the Kim Chong-il buildup has been the idolization campaign for his deceased guerrilla mother, Kim Chong-suk, which serves to strengthen his "revolutionary" credentials. In mid-August, for example, the regime took the unusual step of naming two administrative units, a girls high school and a normal college after Kim Chong-suk, "the indomitable Communist revolutionary fighter." [ ]

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### What's the Rush?

Given the virtual silence concerning Kim Chong-il for the seven months following the Sixth Party Congress, the recent splurge of publicity is difficult to explain. It could reflect the regime's determination to signal that any existing opposition to the younger Kim's succession has been overcome or is being successfully managed. [ ]

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The renewed emphasis on the son could also conceivably be occasioned by a deterioration in the health of Kim Il-song. Although some recent reporting has indicated that Kim Il-song's health is worsening, it is clear that he has not taken to his sickbed or faded into retirement. He goes on frequent guidance trips around the country, chairs political committee meetings, and meets large numbers of foreign visitors. His busy schedule does not, however, necessarily rule out a deterioration of his health or a gradual worsening of old ailments. [ ]

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The new campaign also could be Pyongyang's way of signaling to the populace that Kim Chong-il is now ready to assume the duties of his father. [ ]

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[ ] the younger Kim has been gradually taking over more of the duties of Kim Il-song and that the "great leader" is assuming more and more of a figurehead role. While Kim Chong-il has not completely taken over all of his father's power and authority, he probably does exercise an almost total

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day-to-day control over the party machinery. He also appears to exercise a great deal of control over the economy and the government bureaucracy. [redacted]

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Kim Chong-il frequently goes on "work guidance" visits to the provinces and gives instructions in the Kim Il-song style. On the diplomatic circuit in Pyongyang, it is now considered proper to send gifts to both Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il on various occasions and to offer toasts to both at banquets--which have been reported in the media. Moreover, the younger Kim has now begun to meet foreign visitors [redacted]

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[redacted] Kim Chong-il reportedly does not, however, play a major role in foreign affairs. [redacted]

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The elder Kim is almost certainly attempting to solidify support for his son in the North Korean military--support he would need to assure a smooth succession. Kim Chong-il was, in fact, named to the party's "military committee" at the congress in October 1980. It is not clear, however, how much control the younger Kim has over the military and military affairs. International Bureau Director Kim Yong-nam recently told Japanese reporters that Kim Chong-il has been assisting Kim Il-song in "carrying out military policies." [redacted]

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#### A Government Post?

To consolidate his legitimacy as the successor, Kim Chong-il will almost certainly have to assume a high-ranking government position. A suitably prestigious post would be that of a first vice president or first deputy premier. Such an appointment could come at a Supreme Peoples Assembly meeting this fall or next spring, perhaps preceded by the passage of a constitutional amendment specifying how the succession would be handled. The North Korean Constitution does not provide for presidential succession. Kim Il-song's 70th birthday--which he will celebrate next April--in fact could provide a suitable occasion for the regime to move the succession process to the next stage. [redacted]

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SOUTH KOREA: A QUIET NATIONAL ASSEMBLY [REDACTED]

Chun Doo Hwan's "New Era" National Assembly, now well into its regular 90-day session, is living up to expectations that it will give a lackluster performance. A number of potentially contentious issues could give opposition lawmakers an opportunity to show their feistiness before the session ends in December, but the lawmakers are not likely to challenge the government outright.

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A Restrained Mood

Purged of the most flamboyant and obstreperous politicians of the old era, and operating under a number of restrictions and government pressures, the National Assembly so far has lacked the confrontational posture that characterized its predecessors. It has a long way to go before it will regain the place where legislators can criticize the government with relative impunity.

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There appears to be little desire within the opposition parties to take on the government or the majority Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Most lawmakers feel that anything controversial they say will not be reported in the media, and it makes no sense to stick their necks out. Lawmakers also appear to be less informed than their predecessors. Given a cautious and tame opposition and an essentially uninformed progovernment party, it seems unlikely that the lawmakers will attempt to assert themselves in the current session.

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Moreover, the National Assembly convened in a somewhat chastened--and embarrassed--mood. A miniscandal in which a number of education committee members were accused of receiving gifts (read "bribes") of rush mats (value under \$200 each) from an educational association tarnished the body's image. Lawmakers involved were removed from their committee posts, somewhat chagrined at being victims of Chun Doo Hwan's anticorruption campaign--and over such a paltry matter. The arrest of one of the assemblymen for passing bad checks has not helped restore the damaged prestige.

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Inasmuch as every member of the National Assembly is almost certain to be involved in much worse peccadillos, the government will have no shortage of such incidents to use as threats to keep the lawmakers in line. [ ] 25X1

### Objectives and Emphases Differ

Chun's budget message and the keynote speeches of the various parties reflect the differing concerns and objectives of the main political alignments. Chun singled out four administrative guidelines that constitute the government's main concerns: strengthening defense capability, restoring economic growth, improving the livelihood of the people by expanding social development, and promoting "spiritual culture." Chun also stressed the need for national reconciliation and cooperation--an indirect call for a docile opposition. [ ] 25X1

The opposition parties are concentrating on more sensitive issues. Democratic Korea Party (DKP) Chairman Yoo Chi-song, in his keynote speech, criticized the government's rule by fiat, called for an end to the nation's "climate of distrust," restoration of the National Assembly's powers, greater press freedom, more local autonomy, the reinstatement of banned politicians, and the freeing of political prisoners jailed during the Park Chung Hee era. [ ] 25X1

The opposition Korean National Citizens Party (KNCP) was more concerned with economic issues. It proposed a new budget and tax structure, including repeal of the unpopular value-added tax, and a rejection of a proposed education tax. Its chairman, Lee Man Sup, also called for reducing the proposed average per-capita tax by 0.2 percent for 1982 and guaranteeing farmers that 100 percent of their bumper rice crops would be purchased. To achieve these goals, Lee called for a trimming of the bloated government administrative structure, denationalizing some state-run firms, and reducing the overall budget by 3 percent. [ ] 25X1

### Stirrings of Spirit

Interpellations of government ministers have given the opposition an opportunity to criticize the administration and the DJP and snipe at the defunct Legislative Committee that passed the restrictive National Assembly

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Law and Basic Press Law. Prime Minister Nam Duck Woo and the other ministers proved adept at sidestepping contentious issues or giving noncommittal answers, prompting the press and some assemblymen to grumble about "incoherent and verbose answers" provided by some ministers. [ ] 25X1

Despite opposition attempts to introduce the issue of press law revision, the government is unlikely to support any changes in the law, which is the legal foundation for the heavy restrictions on the media. In fact, said Prime Minister Nam during the interpellations, the Basic Press Law has proven "well suited to our national situation." Many progovernment legislators also support the press law and are unwilling to have the matter debated on the floor. [ ] 25X1

The government did agree in private negotiations to let the opposition introduce amendments to the National Assembly Law--which would expand the lawmakers' authority. These amendments are in committee and are expected out around late November or early December. There is little hope, however, that they will be allowed to pass the Assembly. [ ] 25X1

Some sparks are expected to fly when the parliament debates the government-proposed education tax bill during the session. The tax revenues would be used to expand educational facilities. The DKP opposes the tax, holding that the needed funds should come from the annual budget instead. [ ] 25X1

Debate on the 1982 budget--which reflects a 19-percent increase over last year's--should also give opposition assemblymen ample opportunity to take the government to task even though this is the smallest increase since 1973. One opposition leader has already termed Chun's budget message "unsatisfactory and insincere," and others have criticized the proposed budget as putting too heavy a burden on the nation's taxpayers. [ ] 25X1

Although the remaining two months of the session should provide some spirited debates, there seems little likelihood of any serious political problems arising from the floor of the National Assembly. [ ] 25X1

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CHRONOLOGY: JAPAN

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30 September - 15 October 1981

I. DOMESTIC POLITICAL EVENTS

Deaths

5 October: Suehiro Nishio, 90, founder and former chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party, dies.

Administrative Reform Committees

7 October: Special committees formed in both houses of the Diet begin deliberation on administrative reform package, which includes 36 bills.

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Northern Territories

4 October - ?: A 10-member delegation, organized by the League for the Return of the Northern Territories and headed by Nemuro City Mayor Isao Terashima, visits the US Mission to the United Nations in New York as well as officials in Washington to appeal for support in their opposition to Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories.

III. FOREIGN VISITORS

7 October: Visiting Philippine Prime Minister Cesar Virata calls on Prime Minister Suzuki to discuss bilateral relations and the Cancun summit to be held on 22-23 October.

11 October: H. Dabiri, president of the Tehran-based Iran-Japan Petrochemical Co., leaves Tokyo

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after a two-week visit, during which he held talks with Japanese partners on a suspended joint project to build a giant petrochemical plant in southern Iran.

12-15 October: Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat visits Japan at the invitation of the private Japan-Palestine Dietmen's Friendship League. He holds talks with Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Sonoda.

12-19 October: United Arab Emirates Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Mani ibn Said al-Utaybah visits Japan. He meets with Prime Minister Suzuki and also attends a board meeting of the Abu Dhabi Oil Co., a Tokyo-based firm.

14-16 October: US Secretary of Agriculture Block visits Japan to discuss increasing imports of US grains and moving up scheduled renegotiation of beef and citrus import quotas.

#### IV. AGREEMENTS

30 September: Tokyo and Washington issue simultaneous press releases announcing agreement to accelerate the rate of reduction of tariffs on semiconductors agreed upon during the Tokyo round of the multi-lateral trade negotiations.

6 October: Japan and the Soviet Union sign an agreement on development of timber resources in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The Soviet Union will deliver about 12 million cubic meters of timber and 1.2 tons of sawn timber to Japan from 1981 through 1987. Japan will supply about \$869 million in credit to the Soviet Union.

8 October: Japan announces a basic agreement with Poland to export 20,000 tons of rice on a deferred payment basis at slightly over \$434 per ton. Payment will be spread over 10 years after a five-year grace period. Shipment is to begin by the end of October.

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8 October: Japan and the five members of ASEAN agree to promote a human resource development project. Japan will supply \$100 million to build vocational training centers in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, establish a health care system in Thailand, and strengthen agriculture-related industries in the Philippines.

V. FOREIGN TRAVEL

9-13 October: Foreign Minister Sonoda attends President Sadat's funeral in Cairo. During his visit he talks to Vice President Moubarek and other high-level foreign officials, including Secretary of State Haig and Israeli Prime Minister Begin.

10-11 October: A Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) parliamentary delegation, headed by Hirokichi Nadao, a former Cabinet minister, attends a ceremony in Taiwan to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China on 10 October.

11 October: Masumi Esaki, a senior LDP member of the House of Representatives, returns home after visiting Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, and Bahrain as a special government envoy. He also visited Egypt to offer condolences on the death of President Sadat.

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